Fashioning Philosophers

Philosophical Styles and Philosophical Personae in the Academic Philosophy of the Early Modern German Empire

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Introduction

In 1717 Christian Thomasius (1655-1728), by then a celebrated Protestant Staatsrechtler, jurisconsult, and public intellectual, republished the political testament of Melchior Osse — first published in 1556 when Osse had been chancellor to Duke August of Saxony — to which Thomasius now added an extensive commentary for the use of his students at the University of Halle. In the course of his comments on the teaching of philosophy at Protestant universities, Thomasius drew a passage from a satirical work (*Lucia*) by the Lutheran rhetorician and moralist Johann Balthasar Schupp (1610-1661), telling the story of a father visiting his son for breakfast at the university where he is studying:

The father greeted the son and sat next to him. Finally, he asked him what he had learned during his entire time at the university for the large amount of money he had sent him. The son answered: My dear father, I have learned logic. And you now see that three eggs lie in this bowl, but I will show you through my logic that not three but five eggs lie in the bowl. If this subtlety is too high for you, you must not let it seem strange; for it is an art and has also cost you much money. You are a poor simple lay-person, and because of that

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1 This paper offers an outline of the landscape of German seventeenth-century *Schulphilosophie*, focusing on the diversity of philosophical styles and personae. It remains work in progress, so that some parts of the landscape remain broadly sketched and await further research, while others have more detail and are peopled with particular philosophers and their agendas. Its size is indicative of the fact that it is intended as an overview of my contribution to the ‘persona of the philosopher’ project.
you have sent me to the university, so that I could learn wisdom and art. Therefore I will now argue and construct the following syllogism or demonstration: Who has three eggs also has two. Now, three and two are five, as all masters of arithmetic confess. From this it follows that who has three eggs also has five. The father answered: Son, I see that I have invested my money well. I will take the three eggs that lie in the bowl and eat them, you may eat the remaining two which you have won through logic.²

Schupp’s anti-scholastic satire — in which the teaching of Aristotelian syllogistic is treated as both uselessly subtle and a threat to good character — is homely enough; yet in his Osse commentary Thomasius incorporates it in a wide-ranging critical discussion of the teaching of philosophy in Protestant universities during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This was a discussion that linked the character of philosophy to the way it was taught in the university and to the kind of person it formed, and Thomasius had been pursuing it since the 1680s. In his essay on Wie ein junger Mensch zu informieren sei (How a Young Man is to be Educated) of 1689, Thomasius had identified philosophy with the teaching of the philosophy faculty, whose role should be to prepare students for the higher studies of law, theology and medicine. As a professor of law, Thomasius had no qualms in declaring the philosophical disposition he required for future jurists: ‘Therefore, I also demand as my auditors such individuals as do not take the mere shell of philosophy as their final goal — and following the erroneous pagan doctrine seek their highest good in speculation — but such as strive to turn their philosophy to the real benefit of the human race’.³ Those who did seek their highest good in speculation, Thomasius argued, were the product of a metaphysically-oriented philosophy curriculum. This both stunted their ethical formation, by detouring them into the purely intellectual moral philosophy of Aristotle, but also threatened the tranquility of religion and state by mixing theology and philosophy in such dangerous hybrids as ‘Christian logic’. In asking what purpose was served by this philosophia Christiana, Thomasius comments:

If this Christian logic serves no other purpose than to show ill-disciplined individuals how they can oppose the country’s high authorities under the cover of a hypocritical religiosity, then the universities can well dispense with it. For true Christianity teaches something quite different, and such pedants only betray themselves as shrews, in that they seek to damage the authority of the high leaders in accordance with their own reputation, and seek through untimely denigration to burden with vice other innocents who are typically accustomed to show the most proper obedience towards the high authorities.\footnote{C. Thomasius, ‘Von den Mängeln der aristotelischen Ethik’ (1688), \textit{Kleine Teutsche Schriften} (Hildesheim, 1994), pp. 71-116, at p. 92.}

The persona formed by the teaching of university philosophy was thus of pivotal significance for Thomasius. In one regard it pertained to the form in which students would cultivate a distinctive inner deportment, or array of ethical and intellectual dispositions (habitus). In a second regard, because the university connected this deportment to the filling of public offices, the cultivation of a philosophical persona was directly implicated in the deeply divided religious and political world of the early modern Holy Roman German Empire. In proposing to organise an outline of seventeenth century German academic philosophy around the theme of the philosopher’s persona, this paper will also look in both directions: inwards to an array of intellectual and ethical qualities cultivated via particular ‘spiritual exercises’, and outwards to the volatile world of religious and political institutions, which included the university in which these qualities of the philosophical persona were formed.

If this way of approaching the history of early modern philosophy is little known and unfamiliar to us, that is because, as Knud Haakonssen shows in his paper, in the interim a different conception of philosophy rose to academic dominance, bringing with it a different understanding of the history of philosophy. At the centre of Kantian philosophy we appear not to find a particular philosophical persona, understood as a local deportment formed in accordance with a particular kind of spiritual grooming. Instead, we find the figure of the universal subject, understood as the reflexively self-aware vehicle of transcendental conditions of experience and a transcendent moral identity.
Once the history of philosophy had been rewritten in terms of the progressive recovery of the transcendental conditions of knowledge and morality, then not only Thomasius but the whole history of early modern philosophy lost its intelligibility. It was reduced to a series of shrunken heads representing the oppositions between intellectualism and empiricism, rationalism and voluntarism. It lost all of its personal intensity and public violence, all of its jostling personae, and all of its religious commitment and political significance to the doctrine that the history of philosophy had been leading wholly and solely to the universal subject’s discovery of its own conditions in reason, which happened to occur in the person of a particular academic philosopher.

In using the theme of the philosopher’s persona to investigate the nexus between rival styles of philosophy and conflicting religious and political positions, as these were mediated by the teaching of philosophy in seventeenth-century German universities, the present paper seeks to contribute to research aimed at restoring the historical intelligibility of early modern philosophy.² It begins by using Thomasius’s anti-scholastic historical commentary on *Schulphilosophie* as a way of entering the field *in media res*. It then offers an overview of the major styles of academic philosophy taught in the universities of the Holy Roman Empire during the seventeenth century. Finally, there is a sketch of the transformation of *Schulphilosophie* with the appearance of distinctively different kinds of philosophy and philosopher in the Protestant territories, associated with the figures of Pufendorf and Leibniz.

1. The View From Thomasius

In the course of his commentary on Osse’s political testament, in the detailed notes he added to Osse’s account of the teaching of the liberal arts at the university of Leipzig, Thomasius took the opportunity to reflect on transformations in the teaching of

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² In addition to work undertaken by participants in this seminar, note should be made of H. Holzhey and W. Schmidt-Biggemann, eds., *Die Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts, Band 4: Das heilige Römische Reich deutscher Nation, Nord- und Ostmitteleuropa*, 2 vols. (Basle, 2001). While the contributors to this important work do not thematise the notion of the philosophical persona, they do provide a geo-religious and geo-political mapping of German academic philosophy, paying close attention to confessional disposition of the universities and their philosophy faculties, and to consequent variations in what counted as philosophy and for what purposes.
philosophy in Lutheran universities over the century and a half that separated him from the Saxon Chancellor. In doing so, he provides a snapshot of the history of German academic philosophy during the seventeenth century, albeit a picture taken from the perspective of someone who had himself been deeply enmeshed in battles over what philosophy and the philosopher should be. In using Thomasius’s commentary as a way into it, we thus find ourselves scanning the landscape of German philosophy from a particular viewpoint, suggesting of course not that this viewpoint should be discounted, but that it is one to which we shall need to add others as we make our way.

In the course of his comments on what had been taught in German philosophy faculties during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Thomasius remarks that history and politics had been taught badly — history via the classics and politics via commentaries on Aristotle’s *Politica* — or not at all. In arguing that these ‘Professiones’ are of the highest necessity, Thomasius provides a programmatic outline of the function and form of the philosophy curriculum:

For the universities should be the seminaries of the republic. History shows the people the origin of common errors; the languages are general instruments for reading and understanding the good thoughts of others; the mathematical sciences prepare the understanding so that it can be freed from blind credulity, and have manifold uses in the commonwealth; logic should instruct the subjects to distinguish the true from the false, helping themselves as well as others; ethics should provide men with a living knowledge of the true good and at the same time give instruction in how they should lead a properly virtuous life; and so on. Yet even if I know and practice all these, I still do not know how I should govern ill-disciplined people; but this art demands a wholly separate science, which is of great convenience to the commonwealth, though; for a prudent government is, as it were, the soul of the republic. Now this is what politics should do.⁶

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This is an image of the philosophy curriculum that excludes metaphysics and identifies philosophy with the liberal arts, which are themselves understood as instrumental disciplines preparing students for the higher studies of law, theology, and medicine, and thereby for service to the commonwealth. It represents a program that Thomasius had been developing it since the 1680s, largely in the context of his battle with the Protestant scholastics of the Lutheran universities, the university of Leipzig in particular. In his *Introductio ad philosophiam aulicam* (1688), in which he outlined a philosophical training suited to those who would serve the commonwealth as doctors of law, theology and medicine, Thomasius defined philosophy operationally as that which is taught in ‘our’ (Lutheran) philosophy faculties, and functionally in terms of its propaedeutic role in relation to the higher faculties. At the same time he defined it contrastively and polemically, against those who sought to identify philosophy with metaphysics by treating it as the science of ‘being as being’ and, in doing so, grievously mixed philosophy and theology, confusing natural and revealed knowledge, and civil and religious purposes. In characterising philosophy as ‘that intellectual and instrumental disposition [habitus] which considers God, his creatures, and the natural and moral conduct of men in the light of reason, and which investigates the causes of their conduct for the benefit of the human race’, Thomasius was thus particularly intent on opposing it to scholasticism. For, in deriving knowledge of naturally-known things from revelation, and in explicating revealed faith via (Aristotelian) philosophy and the principles of


natural reason, scholasticism had given rise to a sectarian *philosophia Christiana* which had long stifled philosophical liberty.

Thomasius’s conception of philosophy was fundamentally historical, as he viewed different philosophies not as approximations to a timeless truth, but as historical schools or sects which claimed to teach timeless truths.\(^\text{10}\) Drawing in part on the work of his father Jakob, Thomasius elaborated his own version of a broad Protestant history of philosophy. Its central themes were the origins of scholasticism, understood as sectarian philosophy, and the recovery of eclectic philosophy, which he regarded as synonymous with modernity and enlightenment (although he scarcely used the latter terms). Sectarian philosophy originated with the contamination of Christian doctrine by Greek philosophy, particularly under the Platonising Fathers Chrysostom, Augustine and Origen.\(^\text{11}\) As a result of this contamination, simple biblical faith was subject to a recondite philosophical elaboration which doctrinalised it, allowing the clergy to monopolise its interpretation. In this way, the clergy claimed sole custody of saving faith, whose mediation would henceforth serve their desire to exercise power over the laity, and, from the time of Constantine, would allow the state to function as the secular arm of this clerical power (‘Papalo-Caesarism’).\(^\text{12}\)

The recovery of the Aristotelian corpus during the later middle ages gave rise to a new form of this scholastic priestcraft as, first in Peter Lombard’s *Sentences* and then in the great systems of Aquinas and Scotus, Christian doctrine was again elaborated via pagan philosophy.\(^\text{13}\) This gave rise to the notion of orthodoxy — the idea that salvation depended on knowledge of a correct doctrine or creed — and allowed the papal church to exercise coercive power by declaring dissenters to be heretics, delivering them over to

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\(^{10}\) For this insight, Thomasius never ceased to express his gratitude to Gottfried Arnold, whose famous *Unparteyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-Historie, von Anfang des Neuen Testaments bis auff das Jahr Christi 1688* (Frankfurt a. M., 1699) had treated rival confessional theologies in this way.

\(^{11}\) Thomasius, *Hof-Philosophie*, pp. 32-5.

\(^{12}\) Thomasius, Hof-Philosophie, pp. 45-6.

compliant civil authorities for ghastly punishments.\textsuperscript{14} It was this philosophically corrupted theology or theosophy that had dominated the Jesuit universities, and had then managed to reassert its grip on the Protestant ones, mixing philosophy and theology to their mutual corruption in metaphysics. It had also helped to keep the teaching of law under the sway of Roman- and canon-law glossators, who used it to enforce orthodoxy through laws against heresy, sacrilege and witchcraft.

Only with the Renaissance recovery of eclectic philosophy, and with the appearance of such modern philosophers as Bacon, Descartes and Hobbes, had it become possible to cultivate philosophy in the eclectic spirit. This entailed acknowledging the incapacity of the human intellect to approach divine truths, rejecting the idea that any philosophical school had a monopoly on such truth, and thereby winning the freedom to pick and choose among diverse philosophies in accordance with their capacity to contribute to human happiness and the needs of the commonwealth.\textsuperscript{15} Finally, Thomasius noted, by reconstructing natural law around the end of sociability — as opposed to that of holiness — Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf had done much to break the scholastic hold on Protestant universities, as this allowed law and politics to break free of moral philosophy and theology.\textsuperscript{16}

In his notes to Osse’s chapter on the liberal arts, however, Thomasius supplemented this epochal history of philosophy with one focused much more narrowly on developments in German \textit{Schulphilosophie} during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This provides us with a much sharper picture, albeit one seen designed to serve the interests of those engaged in the battle against scholasticism and \textit{philosophia Christiana}. What is striking in Thomasius’s account is the degree to which it ties conflicts over the philosophy curriculum to confessional conflicts, between Protestantism and Catholicism, but even more importantly to those within Protestantism — between Lutheranism and Calvinism — and, finally, within Lutheranism itself. Thomasius thus


begins by observing that it was opposition to Catholic *Schulphilosophie* that had led Luther to attack the teaching of Scotist metaphysics and Aristotelian philosophy, and that had led Melanchthon to create a new philosophy curriculum at the university of Wittenberg in the 1520s.\(^{17}\) This curriculum had excluded metaphysics and identified philosophy with the liberal arts: grammar, dialectic and rhetoric — crucial for the training of clergy — together with arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy, and supplemented by (Aristotelian) physics and ethics. Thomasius regarded Melanchthon’s re-admission of Aristotle as indicative of his humanist formation, which left him ill-equipped to deal with the rapidly evolving disciplines of politics and history.\(^{18}\) Citing his own examination of Wittenberg’s academic statutes, in which he could find no provision for the teaching of metaphysics during the sixteenth century,\(^{19}\) Thomasius concludes that the discipline had been abolished, which leads him to ask a question still on the agenda of historical research: ‘How has it happened that after this time the Protestants again lapsed so deeply into papalism, and the querulous metaphysics abolished in our author’s [Melanchthon’s] time has again been raised so high, if such has occurred?’\(^{20}\)

In answering this question, Thomasius begins by noting the attacks on Melanchthon (for his ‘crypto-Calvinism’) initiated by Flacius Ilyricus during the 1550s.\(^{21}\) These attacks were associated with the proclamation of the *Formula of Concord* in 1557. Formulated as the definitive confession of the Lutheran faith, and subscribed to by the majority of Protestant princes, the *Formula* was deeply indebted to metaphysical theology in the form of a speculative Christology.\(^{22}\) Like many modern historians, Thomasius takes the republication of Johannes Versor’s *Epitome Metaphysicae Aristotelicae* at Wittenberg in 1596 (original 1491) as symptomatic of the return of metaphysics to the Protestant


\(^{18}\) Thomasius, *Osse*, note 152, pp. 325-8.


\(^{20}\) Thomasius, *Osse*, note 151, p. 322.


academy, noting that in his Foreword Saloman Geßner justifies the teaching of metaphysics in terms of the need to defend Lutheran conceptions of Christ and the Eucharist against the Calvinists. This was soon followed by the appointment of Jakob Martini to teach metaphysics at Wittenberg at the beginning of the seventeenth century, where, despite the opposition of anti-metaphysical Lutherans such as Wenzelaus Schilling, a tradition of Lutheran metaphysics was established.\(^{23}\) In tracking the development of this tradition into the seventeenth century, Thomasius pays particular attention to elaboration of variants known as gnostology and noology — by Abraham Calov and Georg Meier — supposed to ground metaphysics in a theory of the first principles of knowledge, but in fact subjecting the ‘poor people’ to the useless and damnable fantasies of speculative metaphysics. It is in this context that Thomasius cites Schupp’s story of the boy logician who multiplied eggs via syllogism.

Thomasius’s polemical and programmatic account of the philosophy curriculum provides a useful initial vantage point for the landscape of early modern German philosophy, precisely because he was an embattled and transitional figure. Looking backward from his standpoint, the topography of philosophy in the northern and central parts of the Holy Roman German Empire begins to assume a characteristic form. First, what counted as philosophy depended on the teaching programs of university philosophy faculties. Philosophy was *Schulphilosophie*, shaped (in different ways) by its propaedeutic relation to the higher faculties, and to the states and churches for which these faculties provided doctors of law, theology and medicine. Second, the topography of academic philosophy was deeply divided along confessional and confessional-political lines. Not only did what count as philosophy vary along these lines — as we can see in Thomasius’s Lutheran rejection of metaphysically-oriented philosophy in favour of an eclectic liberal arts model — but so too did its teaching and the ends it was expected to serve. Third, this division was registered in competing models of the philosophical persona, as conflicts over the ideal way of life and knowledge issued in conflicts over the cultivation of kind of person who would live this life and accede to this truth.

Looking forward from Thomasius’s vantage point, we obtain a view of one version of ‘modern’ philosophy, usually identified as the early *Aufklärung*. First there is the

historicising outlook, which allowed Thomasius a certain measure of independence from the confessional conflicts that characterised *Schulphilosophie*, even if this outlook was itself initially indebted to certain aspects of Protestant culture. Second, the adoption of the eclectic philosophical style was a means of measuring a certain distance from the ‘sectarian’ — unified, centralised, authority-based — character of academic philosophy, as eclectic philosophy provided the intellectual incentives and techniques for making the individual philosopher himself responsible for his intellectual choices. This had the effect of making the individual philosopher’s personality into an object of attention and cultivation.²⁴ Third, as a result of these changes, it became possible for academic philosophers such as Thomasius and his mentor Samuel Pufendorf to facilitate the reception of non-academic ‘modern’ philosophers from Western Europe — Bacon, Descartes, Gassendi, Grotius, Hobbes — with profound consequences for the academic philosophy of the Holy Roman German Empire. As we shall see, Pufendorf’s reception of Hobbes would play a key role in the dissolution of Protestant scholasticism and *philosophia Christiana*.

This is as far as we can go with Thomasius, however. Through the immediacy of his polemical engagement, he has enabled us to step back from Kantian philosophical history and into the volatile landscape of seventeenth-century German academic philosophy. Yet the very immediacy of Thomasius’s engagement gives rise to a characteristic blind spot with regards to scholasticism, which he was incapable of investigating except as the nightmare from which he is waking. In traversing the landscape of *Schulphilosophie*, then, we shall these need to supplement his advice with other guides.

### 2. Seventeenth-Century German *Schulphilosophie*: Styles and Personae

German philosophy during the seventeenth century was overwhelmingly academic, meaning that its forms, contents and functions were largely determined by the teaching programs of the philosophy or arts faculties of the Empire’s universities. The sixteenth

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²⁴ We can see this by comparing Thomasius’s philosophy with his father’s. Thomasius makes his personality — his confessions of sins, limitations, mistakes and triumphs — play a key role in the elaboration of his philosophical positions; while his father, Jakob, who was an important academic philosopher of the prior generation, has no philosophical personality in this sense.
and seventeenth centuries witnessed an unprecedented and still unmatched proliferation of universities in continental Europe, driven not by humanism or the love of learning, however, but by the twinned forces of confessionalisation and state-building.\textsuperscript{25} During the seventeenth century, 10 new German universities were added the existing 24, with the period of intensive development stretching from the 1580s to the 1690s.\textsuperscript{26} As a result the confessional and political rivalries of Empire’s cities and territories, universities and academic gymnasiums (\textit{gymnasia illustre}) were often founded in direct response the appearance of confessionally opposed institutions in neighbouring domains. This was in order to prevent a loss of students and to maintain the confessional integrity of the territory’s school teachers, clergy, jurists and officials. Most universities were small by modern standards — averaging around 200-300 students — and would typically be staffed by 6 to 8 philosophy professors complemented by 3 or 4 professors for each of the three higher faculties.\textsuperscript{27} The German situation contrasts strongly with the English, with only two universities and a scatter of dissenting academies. Yet although the proliferation and confessional rivalries of the German universities would have profound effects on the comparative development of German philosophy, there is reason to be sceptical of accounts stressing the greater openness and modernity of German institutions in comparison with English where, it has been claimed, arts remained more closely tied to theology.\textsuperscript{28} Not only does this view ignore Germany’s Catholic (Jesuit) universities,


where philosophy remained strictly subordinate to theology, but it fails to grasp the intensity and complexity of interaction between (Aristotelian) philosophy and confessional theology in the Empire’s Protestant universities.

Philosophy faculties had two broad tasks: to prepare students for the theology faculty, whose professors were responsible for maintaining the doctrinal purity of the confession and the orthodoxy of its teachers;²⁹ and to prepare them for the study of law and medicine, in accordance with the needs of the princely courts for jurists, politici and administrators.³⁰ These tasks could be difficult to reconcile, sometimes defined different kinds of university, and had parted company in Protestant universities by the end of the century. At the beginning the century, however, the flourishing of Aristotelian philosophy in its late-humanist form provided a common philosophical language not only for different faculties but for the confessionally divided universities and their professors.³¹ Aristotelianism thus provided a shared intellectual repertory for academic philosophy — in the areas of logic, physics, metaphysics and, to a lesser degree, ethics and politics — even if these were developed in diverse, often opposed ways, as they were used to elaborate and defend confessionally divided Christian doctrine.³²

We need to take note, however, of two extra-academic forms of philosophy, which had originated during the Renaissance and which occasionally interacted with Schulphilosophie producing significant hybrid forms. Lullism, named after its progenitor, the Catalan thinker Ramón Llull (Raimundus Lullus) (c. 1232- c 1316), was opposed to some of the main tendencies of academic philosophy, in particular the instrumentalising of logic and the ontologising of metaphysics. Lullism was centred in an ‘art’ — part mnemotechnique, part combinatoric — that was understood as the intellectual means by

²⁹ T. Kaufmann, Universität und lutherische Konfessionalisierung. Die Rostocker Theologieprofessoren und ihr Beitrag zur theologischen Bildung und kirchlichen Gestaltung im Herzogtum Mecklenburg zwischen 1550 und 1675 (Gütersloh, 1997).
which the human mind participated in God's thinking of the principles responsible for the entire order of things in the world.\textsuperscript{33} It aspired to be a confessionally neutral super philosophy — beyond both logic and metaphysics as they were usually practiced — but was cultivated differently by those few Catholics and Protestants who integrated it into \textit{Schulphilosophie}.\textsuperscript{34} Catholics (Franciscans and Jesuits) used it as a supplement to Scotist metaphysics, treating Lull's combinatorial art as the mode of insight into the axioms or absolute principles that determined the possibility of things. Protestants tended to develop it in a more encyclopedic and eschatological direction, treating the ‘great art’ as a partial restitution of the integral knowledge that man had possessed prior to the fall.

Further removed from university philosophy, and finding its home in world of smaller princely courts and their savants and physicians, was the tradition of hermetic-platonic natural philosophy.\textsuperscript{35} This derived from the Renaissance recovery of neo-Platonic texts, but was transmitted in the so-called ‘Hermetic Corpus’, a mix of neo-Platonic, alchemical, kabalistic, neo-Pythagorean, and Stoic doctrines falsely attributed to the mythic Hermes Trismegistos. It was based around the notion of the hermeneutic recovery of an esoteric ancient wisdom (\textit{prisca theologia} or \textit{prisca sapientia}), hidden beneath the surface of both texts and things, and it positioned the philosopher as the privileged seer or interpreter of the hidden correspondences of things. Grounded in a mytho-philosophical account of God’s creation of the ‘seed-forms’ of all future things from the primal chaos, hermetic neo-Platonism attributed the ordering of these forms to a world soul or world spirit. This conception was responsible for to its opposition to Aristotelian and modern mechanical philosophy, not least because it was the means of establishing philosophy as an essentially hermeneutic discipline. By operating a set of binary oppositions (inner/outer, above/below, visible/invisible) it allowed the material visible world to be seen as the outer manifestation of an invisible, immaterial world, with the two worlds


being held together by the fundamental principle of ‘doubling’: everything in one world has its double in the other. This applied in particular to the concepts of elements, stars, seeds, trees and heaven, which allowed for a complex matrix of similarities and affinities to be established, capable of guiding interpretation (earthly elements are corporeal forms of stars) and alchemical speculations. The human imagination could be envisaged as containing the ‘stars’ (ideas) of all things, making it into the source of all magical operations. The great thought-figure of the microcosm and the macrocosm played a key role in organising the multiple system of interconnections and affinities linking all parts of the world to each other and to man. Also central was the notion that these relations were secret or occult, accessible only to those possessing the esoteric knowledge of the ancient wisdom, but visible in the form of ‘signatures’ carried by things themselves. These hieroglyphic signs could be interpreted by the adept — the central image of the philosophical persona in this tradition — and could be represented in emblem books, which formed an important part of the corpus of hermetic neoplatonic nature philosophy.

If Lullism and hermetic neo-Platonism interacted with Aristotelian academic philosophy — the former significantly, the latter as an intellectual outlier — then during the first half of seventeenth century, the forms and limits of this interaction were determined by Schulphilosophie itself. As the statutory order of knowledge responsible for deploying philosophy in the defence of rival confessional theologies, Schulphilosophie was hyper-sensitive to heterodox or heretical ways of integrating philosophy and theology, as the case of Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) testified. Moreover, the doctrines likely to trigger charges of heterodoxy — the Lullist conception of philosophy as a restitution of man’s lost capacity for divine intellection, the neo-Platonic conception of it as esoteric insight into the occult order of the cosmos — were precisely those where the persona of the philosopher was subject to rival constructions and practices of cultivation. As it was through the fashioning of a particular kind of persona that Schulphilosophie sought to shape the moral deportment of those holding office in confessionally divided churches and states, so it was in this register that academic philosophers were most on guard against subversive and heretical philosophies. This is

the light in which we can sketch an overview of the main kinds of academic philosophy, Catholic, Calvinist and Lutheran.

### 2.1. Catholic Schulphilosophie: Philosophy without Philosophers

In introducing his study of early modern Catholic academic philosophy, Paul Blum draws a helpful distinction between ‘philosophers’ philosophy’ and *Schulphilosophie*, noting that the central question raised by this distinction is that of what it means to be a philosopher. Philosophers’ philosophy is grounded in some version of the thinking subject, is warranted by this figure’s individual reason and insights, typically thematises the I, the person, or subjective consciousness, and often engages in the stylisation of a distinctive philosophical personality. Blum mentions Ficino and Bruno in this regard, but we have also noticed this phenomenon in the personality of Thomasius, and many other early moderns could of course be mentioned, from Montaigne to Shaftesbury, or from Descartes to Kant. *Schulphilosophie*, however, is concerned not with self-reflection on subjective consciousness but with the perfection of a body of doctrine. Rather than inspecting the subjective grounds of knowledge or morality, it focuses on the teaching of true doctrine and the repulsion of subversion. In the case of the Jesuits, who were largely responsible for the development of Catholic *Schulphilosophie* during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, while they engaged with neo-Platonic, Cartesian and other forms of modern philosophy, they did so from an unquestioned intellectual order oriented to unity, authority, and teachability. Yet Catholic *Schulphilosophie* was neither medieval nor ossified, being in fact at the cutting edge of the intellectual competition with rival confessional academic philosophy, and continuously striving to perfect its own doctrinal architecture within the parameters of Aristotelian philosophy and Catholic theology. In deriving both the style and content of philosophy from the organisation and purposes of its academic teaching, Catholic *Schulphilosophie* may thus be regarded as the ideal type of this kind.

Apart from the Benedictine university at Salzburg (1625), during the seventeenth century all of the main Catholic universities in the German Empire — Ingolstadt (1459),

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Dillingen (1550), Cologne (1584), Mainz (1563), Würzburg (1582), Graz (1586), and Freiburg (1457) — were directed by the Society of Jesus, as were a series of lesser institutions (at Innsbruck, Molsheim, Paderborn, Osnabrück, Bamberg, Trier, and Erfurt). This was because the Council of Trent (1545) had charged the Jesuit order with a special authority and responsibility for turning back the rising tide of Protestantism, specifically in the areas of science and education. To this end, the Jesuits imbued their archipelago of universities with a double task: combating the theological and pedagogical activities of their Protestant rivals, and reforming the Catholic church from within, by training teachers, clergy and theologians who would be erudite, disciplined and orthodox. The self-conscious goal of these universities was nothing less than the formation of staunchly Catholic ruling elites for both secular and religious domains. For this reason, the philosophical and theological teaching that developed in the Jesuit institutions differed markedly from that which characterised the Catholic monastic orders. Unlike the monastic institutions of the Benedictines and Franciscans — where the Catholic metaphysical tradition was deployed using spiritual exercises aimed at shaping the persona of contemplative ‘angelic doctors’ — Jesuit universities sought to form spiritual soldiers with the inner resolve and intellectual weaponry needed to defeat the heretics, convert the infidel, and reform the laxity of the church itself.

As a hierarchically structured, centrally controlled organisation, headquartered in the Collegium Romanum (1551), the Jesuit order was uniquely placed to develop and impose the unified intellectual-pedagogical order required by its mission. At the core of this order lay a combined arts and theology course. Jesuits typically did not teach law or medicine as these were regarded as lay professions, and many Jesuit colleges consisted only of an arts and theology faculty, producing the metaphysically- or theologically-oriented style of philosophy that Thomasius would identify with scholasticism. The philosophy course lasted for three years and was followed by a four-year theology

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Teaching took place as dictation from Aristotelian commentaries, which formed the basis of text-books, punctuated by disputation whose forensic character informed what counted as proof in the Jesuit intellectual world. The curriculum was divided into inferior studies — grammar, Latin and Greek, and humanities (language, literature and rhetoric) — and superior, the study of philosophy and theology. And it was in this tightly ordered pedagogical-intellectual structure that Catholic Schulphilosophie assumed its distinctive form.

The instrument that ordered the philosophy and theology curriculum, and ensured that Catholic Schulphilosophie was determined by the form of its teaching, was the Ratio studiorum. Formally incorporated into the Order’s constitution in 1599, and governing the entire course of studies down to the most technical details, this order of studies was based on the assumptions that doctrine is unified and truth eternal. In practice this meant that all philosophical disciplines were subordinated to Catholic theology, whose own unity was secured by being taught as commentary on a single authority, the Summa theologiae of Thomas Aquinas. The structure and content of the philosophy course was thus determined not by the interests of philosophers or by a philosophical method, but by its preparatory relation to the theology course. To fulfill this role it been developed as an invariant hierarchical order of disciplines, beginning with one year of logic, followed by a year of physics, and a year which combined physics and metaphysics, all taught via commentaries on Aristotle. This combination of disciplines is what ‘philosophy’ signified in those imperial cities and territories dominated by Catholic Schulphilosophie.

This teleological hierarchy of disciplines culminating in theology, indispensable for the counter-Reformation goals of Jesuit Schulphilosophie, was internally organised

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44 Blum, Philosophenphilosophie und Schulphilosophie, pp. 146-58.
around a specifically Ignation psychology, in which each pedagogical level represented a phase in the intellectual and spiritual cultivation of the student’s disposition.\textsuperscript{47} This allowed for the differentiation of theology and philosophy, and for the internal differentiation of the philosophical disciplines, on the basis of their stadal-developmental order, while simultaneously keeping the order under unquestioned theological domination. In this context, and contrastingly markedly with Protestant \textit{Schulphilosophie}, logic, physics, and metaphysics were expounded as a rising continuum of truths, with truth itself being grounded metaphysically, in the theory of being, rather than methodologically or epistemologically as in Cartesian philosophy. As a result, despite their hierarchical differentiation, the different philosophical disciplines flowed into each other, and theological problems and imperatives flowed down downwards into the philosophical disciplines, just as metaphysical doctrine flowed upward into theology.

In self-conscious opposition to the Ramist and humanist-Aristotelian (Zabarella) instrumental logics taught in Protestant universities, the logic taught in Jesuit universities was thus metaphysical, with the key concept of \textit{entia rationis} (rational entities) covering both the real being of mental operations and also the rational knowability of extra-mental beings or things.\textsuperscript{48} Similarly, in teaching physics through Aristotle’s books on the Heavens, Meteors, and On Generation and Corruption, Jesuit academic physics did not treat these as independent areas of investigation, but as permutations on a single set of principles pertaining to body as corporeal or ‘moved’ being: the principles of form, matter, and cause. The heavens were thus unchangeable body, meteors changeable unliving body, and the soul changeable (corruptible) living body. The central role played by theology in determining physics — and the key reason for excluding experimental-mathematical physics — can be seen in the fact that angels required a specific physical derivation, as incorporeal moved entities, in order to be part of the world.\textsuperscript{49}

Finally, the hierarchical position of Jesuit metaphysics in the \textit{Ratio studiorum} also explains its internal teleological relation to theology.\textsuperscript{50} Both logic and metaphysics were understood to arrive at their objects by abstracting from things and matter. Abstraction in

\textsuperscript{47} Blum, ‘Grundzüge’, p. 308.
\textsuperscript{50} Blum, ‘Grundzüge’, pp. 325-30.
metaphysics, however, was held not to be ‘mental’ — leading only to logic’s mental entities (*entia rationis*) — but real, leading to ‘real being’ or being as being (*ens qua ens*). Discovered in this way, abstracted being was thus held to really exist in its abstracted form. In the case of being in general, this meant that essences or substances really existed independently of material things. And in the case of God and the angels, as immaterial beings, such substances clearly really did exist abstracted from matter. This led to a dilemma, however, for if the modes of abstraction leading to the substances and to God were treated as the same, then metaphysics threatened to turn into a universal science of sciences grounded in divine intellection; but if they were treated as radically distinct, then ontology and natural theology threatened to break apart, with the latter turning into pneumatology, or the science of incorporeal substances, which is what occurred in Protestant *Schulphilosophie*. In addressing this problem, Thomism made God into the fundamental object of metaphysics, but declared that his uncreated being could only be spoken of analogically in relation to created being. The fact that this allowed abstraction in the case of God and the angels to reach real immaterial substances, while abstraction in the case of general being only reaches essences that remain attached to matter, shows the degree to which the architecture of Jesuit metaphysics remained deeply informed by its role as natural theology. This should lead us to be cautious of accounts arguing that through its doctrine of ‘being as being’ Jesuit metaphysics created a neutral set of axioms for both philosophy and theology, thereby shedding its role of reconciling Aristotelian philosophy and Catholic doctrine, and forming a philosophical idiom common to all the confessions.\(^{51}\)

Two features of Jesuit academic philosophy contrast with its Protestant counterparts. First, not only was the teaching of philosophical doctrine independent of the teacher’s personal choice — which was also largely true of Protestant *Schulphilosophie* — but in Jesuit universities it was also detached from the cultivation of the persona of the philosopher. This was because Jesuits typically taught the three-year philosophy course only once, before being moved on to other duties: theology teaching, missionary activities, providing spiritual direction in secular settings. Members of the Jesuit teaching

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corps typically did not relate to themselves as specialist philosophers, and did not govern
the formation of their students in this persona.\textsuperscript{52} None of the Jesuits who taught
philosophy in German universities during the seventeenth century are thus known as
philosophers, even though they compiled formidable philosophical text-books based on
the common commentaries of the order. To understand the persona cultivated in Jesuit
\textit{Schulphilosophie} we need to look to the \textit{Ratio studiorum}, with its carefully regulated
stadal development modeling the human intellect through its pedagogical ascent to
metaphysical then revealed truth. And we need to look to the \textit{Exercises} of Ignatius
Loyola, through which the intellectual formation of the university was supplemented by a
body of ascetic exercises designed to forge the inner self-possession and steely resolve of
a corporation of celibates who shaped themselves and dedicated their lives in accordance
with the mission of the Order.\textsuperscript{53}

Second, as a result of the clearly differentiated and hierarchically ordered relation
between philosophy and theology — and due to the unified and centralised international
religious organisation that ensured its maintenance — the teaching of philosophy and
theology in Catholic universities was highly stable in comparison with Protestant
institutions. This meant that Catholic universities did not witness the multiplication of
styles of \textit{Schulphilosophie} and \textit{Schulmetaphysik} characteristic of the less tightly
controlled Protestant academies. And it also meant that throughout the seventeenth
century Catholic \textit{Schulphilosophie} would remain resistant to the new forms of philosophy
— Galilean astronomy, mathematical-experimental physics, Cartesian epistemology,
Grotian-Hobbesian natural law and political philosophy — even though individual Jesuits
contributed to these fields in their extra-curricular personae.

\textbf{2.2. Calvinist Pansophism}

The building of an archipelago of Calvinist universities and academic gymnasiums, in the
north-western cities and territories of the German Empire, was the result of the so-called

\textsuperscript{52} Blum, ‘Grundzüge’, p. 307.
Beginning in the 1580s, this was a campaign by Calvinist cities and princes, who had refused to subscribe to the Lutheran *Formula of Concord* (1577), to pursue an independent confessionalising reform of church and society; it had also received significant impetus from the Catholic massacre of their co-religionists in France on St. Bartholomew’s Day (August 27) in 1572. As with the Catholic counter-Reformation, the twin goals of confessionalising society and reforming the church required the establishment of universities and gymnasiums capable of forming an educated and disciplined ruling elite. In the Calvinist case, however, this would be undertaken not by a single centralised religious order but by particular alliances between religious reformers and political elites, networked to Calvinist communities in France, Holland, Scotland and England. These were the broad circumstances driving the establishment of Calvinist universities or gymnasiums at Marburg (Calvinist in 1605), Heidelberg (Calvinist 1563/1583), Steinfurt (1588/91), Bremen (1581), Herborn (1584), Duisburg (1636/55), and Frankfurt/Oder (mixed Calvinist and Lutheran since 1613). Often, as in the cases of Steinfurt and Duisburg, these institutions were established to counter the effects of rival Catholic or Lutheran institutions being built in neighbouring cities or territories.

No less than its Catholic and Lutheran rivals, the objective of Calvinist *Schulphilosophie* was to teach a unified body of doctrine in which natural (philosophical) and revealed knowledge had been harmonised in accord with overarching confessional-theological imperatives. Yet, owing to absence of a binding doctrinal and pedagogical resolutions to these issues (analogous to the decrees of the Council of Trent and the rules of the *Ratio studiorum*), and because of the distinctive character of Calvinist devotional practice and speculative theology — particularly in the areas of ecclesiology, Christology, the Eucharist, and justification (predestination) — the manner in which Calvinist *Schulphilosophie* evolved to carry out its confessional tasks differed decisively from its rivals. Calvinist academic philosophy rejected Aristotelian metaphysics (regarded as contaminated by Averroism), and in so doing turned away from the complex

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differentiation and harmonisation of (Aristotelian) philosophy and (Thomist) theology characteristic of the Jesuit program. As a result, Calvinist philosophers developed a different kind of metaphysics (or First Philosophy) and made this metaphysics itself responsible for direct (non-analogical) knowledge of God, rather than subordinating it to revealed theology. This First Philosophy thus itself held the superordinate place in Calvinist Schulphilosophie, and because God was the immediate object of metaphysical knowledge, Calvinist philosophers possessed the functions and standing of theologians.

Unfolding in this exalted theosophical or Christosophical space, Calvinist Schulphilosophie assumed the form of a single all-embracing system of knowledge, beginning with God and extending to the objects of all the arts and sciences. Some philosophers, such as Marburg’s Rudolf Goclenius (1547-1628) and Heidelberg’s Bartholomäus Keckermann (1572-1609), continued to call this new univocal metaphysics by the old name of the science of ‘being as being’. In doing so, however, they radically altered its Thomistic understanding. They treated metaphysics as a general science of being which drew no principled distinction between divine and created being; and they placed this new metaphysical First Philosophy above theology — in radical opposition to their Jesuit and Lutheran counterparts — albeit for religious reasons. But the fundamentally Platonic underpinnings of the new conception surfaced more explicitly in the work of Clemens Timpler (1563-1624) who changed the object of First Philosophy from ‘being as being’ to ‘everything intelligible’ (omne intelligible) and who reconstructed metaphysics in Ramist terms as an art or techné. First Philosophy thus came to be understood as the art of contemplation through which all the ‘intelligibles’ — regarded as divine concepts open to a natural reason assisted by the appropriate art — could be revealed to knowledge. Through the organisation of arts — the ‘system’ — men could know more and better than through their unaided experience and reason, partially restoring intellectual abilities lost with the Fall and gaining the capacity to reform and perfect society.

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56 See J. S. Freedman, European Academic Philosophy in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries: The Life, Significance, and Philosophy of Clemens Timpler (1563/4 - 1624) (Hildesheim, 1988).
Evolving on this basis, Calvinist *Schulphilosophie* found its characteristic mode of expression not in the commentary or disputation, but in the encyclopedia or *technologia*, understood as the ‘system of systems’. The massive works of Herborn’s Johann Alsted (1588-1638) are characteristic in this regard. Alsted’s way of accessing the intelligibles drew on the Lullist tradition, as he regarded the fundamental concepts of his system — such things as goodness, magnitude, power, wisdom, will, truth, end — as divine predicates. This meant that he treated them as presupposed by God in his creation of the world and thus as flowing into the world, albeit in a disguised form. It was the role of the great art to recover these constitutive concepts and, in doing so, to allow man to accede to the entirety of intelligible things from the viewpoint of the world’s creator. In his massive *Encyclopaedia Septem tomis distincta* (1630), Alsted made greater allowance for fallen understanding, diversifying the arts through which man compensated for his intellectual limits into a complete array of scientific disciplines.\(^57\) Yet he continued to impose unity on the encyclopedia by treating each discipline as the bearer of an art granting access to divinely unified intelligibles and principles. It is significant that in the *Encyclopaedia*, metaphysics does not appear until the third volume. Here, it is located as one of the theoretical disciplines alongside physics and the mathematical arts, having forfeited its place as First Philosophy to a universal science containing the principles of all the arts and disciplines. Theology was also treated as a particular art, appearing in volume 5 alongside law and medicine, and so on, in a vast Ramist tree structure whose bifurcating branches extend all the way to the mechanical arts of volume 6 — agriculture, gardening, baking, brewing, pharmacology, metallurgy, typography — in an extraordinary effort to follow the divine intelligibles down to the capillary arts of life.

Contrasting it with its Catholic and Lutheran counterparts, some classic studies have argued the rationalist and modernising tendencies of Calvinist *Schulphilosophie*, focusing on its comparatively high regard for (natural) philosophical reason and its shift from the theory of being to the theory of the intelligible, regarded as pointing towards modern

epistemology. There are two reasons, however, for scepticism regarding such interpretations. In the first place, the elevation of philosophy — in the form of a discipline for acceding to the concepts presupposed in God’s creation of the world — was itself linked to Calvinist theology and devotional practice. Keckermann, for example, who continued to call these concepts substances, regarded their ‘accidents’ simply as properties of the substances themselves, hence as incapable of independent existence as abstracted essences in the Thomist mode. This view might sound similar to modern epistemological doctrines, yet in his Gymnasium logicum, Keckermann used it to attack Lutheran Christological and Lutheran and Catholic Eucharistic theologies. If accidents were simply properties of substances, then it was impossible for the properties of Christ’s divine nature (his spirituality) to be ‘communicated’ to those of his human nature (his corporeality); and this meant that the Lutheran doctrine that Christ was corporeally present in diverse physical places simultaneously (the ‘ubiquity’ doctrine) must be false. For the same reason, the (Catholic and Lutheran) doctrine that the properties of the Eucharistic bread and wine remained unchanged while their substances were converted into Christ’s body and blood, must also be false. This meant that the mass could only be properly practiced in the Calvinist way, as a memorial semiotic for an absent Christ, rather than as a saving participation in Christ’s spiritual-corporeal presence. In short, it is often misleading to draw absolute intellectual-historical judgments (regarding rationality, modernity, secularity) from doctrines specifying the limits of human understanding and how these might be overcome, as these doctrines only take effect within particular spiritual exercises or intellectual cultures. Here their role is

60 B. Keckermann, Gymnasium logicum, id est, De usu & exercitatione logicae artis absolutiori & pleniori, libri tres (London, 1606), pp. It is worth noting that the Gymnasium was one of several of Keckermann’s works published in England during the first decades of the seventeenth century, among which we find an English translation of an incendiary popular theology, Ouranognosia. Heavenly Knowledge: A Manuduction to Theologie (London, 1622), clearly intended to attack English Catholics and Anglo-Catholics.
61 Keckermann, Gymnasium logicum, pp.
to groom the persona of the intellectual who probes the limits of the human, often in order to manifest a particular version of the divine.

Second, and less surprising in light of the preceding comments, it turns out that the encyclopedic form of Calvinist *Schulphilosophie* — the drive for an exhaustive inventory of the totality of arts and sciences — was informed by a powerful chiliastic and eschatological agenda. As Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann has shown in the case of Alsted, the link between Calvinist encyclopedism and millenarianism lies in the treatment of creation as already containing the complete course of nature and history, even if the damage done to man’s understanding at the Fall — itself a signal event in this history — prevents his full awareness of this in the present.\(^6\) The book of nature thus contains secrets which it is the task of man to penetrate through the elaboration of arts which partially restore his fallen understanding, and whose compendium is the universal science of the encyclopedia. Similarly, the ‘book of books’, the Bible, contains the man’s entire past and future, but concealed in an obscure language which only those whose understanding has been restored by the Holy Spirit can interpret, thereby acceding to prophecy.

These were the intellectual and religious preconditions for Alsted’s work of millenarian prophecy, the *Diatribe de mille annis apocalypticis* (1627), in which he uncovered in the book of Daniel and in John’s Revelation all of the key events of the Reformation. In particular, Alsted used the eleventh and twelfth chapters of Daniel in order to interpret the battles of the Thirty Years War as the apocalyptic battles signaling the destruction of the Anti-Christ (the Catholic church) and the last days of the second millennium.\(^6\) This was soon to be closed by Christ’s second coming and the beginning of his thousand-year reign on earth, which Alsted dated at 1694. Alsted’s restitution of

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human faculties and penetration of nature’s secrets in his encyclopedic philosophy was thus paralleled in the biblical-eschatological register by his prophetic disclosure of the already fully prefigured course of history. In this context, the complete cataloguing of man’s earthly understanding represented by the encyclopedia was itself seen as indicative of the general reform of doctrine and life required as a condition of Christ’s return. In transforming metaphysics such that it could scan the entirety of the world — divine and human — from within the single horizon of omnia intelligible, Calvinist Schulphilosophie did indeed elevate the persona of the philosopher it groomed to occupy this pansophic vantage. But in doing so it partially annexed the persona of the prophet, producing a hybrid with significant impact in Calvinist societies.

2.3. Lutheran Schulphilosophie: From Metaphysics to Polyhistory

The scene for the development of Lutheran academic philosophy during the seventeenth century was set by events surrounding the Formula of Concord, ratified in 1577. Intended as a response to the Tridentine counter-Reformation and to intra-Protestant divisions, the Formula was supposed to provide a definitive formulation of Lutheran articles of faith, particularly in the contested areas of Christology, the Eucharist, justification, and ecclesiology. Yet, mocking its own title, it succeeded in definitively excluding the Calvinists while introducing a significant degree of discord within Lutheranism, as an important minority of Lutheran cities and princes refused to ratify its articles. For this reason, the Formula of Concord should not be seen as the Lutheran equivalent of the Tridentine decrees: a unifying theological blueprint through which religious and political authorities could pursue an homogenous confessionalisation of church and society. Nonetheless, the clarity and intensity with which it formulated key Lutheran doctrines — particularly in the divisive area of speculative Christology — served to sharpen Lutheranism’s opposition to both Calvinism and Catholicism, providing Lutheran universities with a new centre of theological gravity, even if they

64 Schmidt-Biggemann, ‘Apokalyptische Universalwissenschaft’, p. 70.
orbited it at different distances.\textsuperscript{68} Moreover, it was the philosophical and apologetic demands imposed by this speculative Christology that saw the eclipse of the ‘Philippo-Ramist’ curriculum — which had excluded metaphysics and identified philosophy with the liberal arts — and the return of a metaphysically-oriented philosophy to the Lutheran university, although in a variety of forms.\textsuperscript{69} Our overview of Lutheran \textit{Schulphilosophie} will thus need to provide a sense of this diversity, but without losing sight of the common underlying features — most visible at the level of the philosophical persona — that distinguished it from its confessional rivals.

One line of division can be marked by distinguishing those Lutheran universities that fell within territories subscribing to the \textit{Formula of Concord} — to which academics had to swear acceptance — and those which did not. To the former belonged Wittenberg (1502, FC 1591), Leipzig (FC 1580), Jena (1548/58, FC 1591), Tübingen (1590/1601), Giessen (1605), Strasbourg (1538/1621), Rinteln (1610/21), Kiel (1665), Greifswald (1456, FC 1577), and Rostock (1419, Lutheran 1531). Lying outside the formal jurisdiction, but not the theological force of the \textit{Formula}, were Altdorf (1578), Königsberg (1544) and, most significantly, Helmstedt (1576). As in Catholic and Calvinist universities, the role of philosophy teaching in these Lutheran ones was to groom students for the occupancy of religious and civil offices in a confessional society. Yet the way in which Lutheran \textit{Schulphilosophie} was organised in relation to confessional theology differed significantly from its Calvinist and Catholic counterparts.\textsuperscript{70} On the one hand, while its central tasks and limits were set by theology, philosophy in the Lutheran curriculum was not seen as a subordinate step on a single ladder of truth leading up to revealed theological truth — as in the Jesuit \textit{Ratio studiorum} — which meant that the philosophical disciplines possessed a greater degree of autonomy in Lutheran universities. On the other hand, despite this autonomy, mainstream Lutheran academic philosophers were radically opposed to the Calvinist strategy of making philosophy itself responsible for theological truth, inside a single encyclopedic universal

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\item[69] Sparn, \textit{Wiederkehr der Metaphysik}.
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science. Rather, they maintained a strict separation between natural and revealed knowledge, even if this distinction itself remained theological. The ‘problem-set’ posed by this state of affairs — how to maintain the relative autonomy of philosophy without it absorbing theology; how to make philosophy serve theology without it being transformed into natural theology or Christian philosophy — was addressed through the elaboration of several forms of Lutheran *Schulphilosophie*, each of which had to demarcate the personae of philosopher and theologian.

The most influential model for negotiating these problems was elaborated by Cornelius Martini (1568-1621) at Helmstedt during the 1590s, which was also where this model encountered its most significant opposition. Martini’s central strategy was to establish philosophy and theology as separate (Aristotelian) sciences by ordering them in accordance with the new theory of proof provided by Jacopo Zabarella. Zabarella’s strictly instrumental logic, which was opposed to both Jesuit metaphysical forms and to Ramist topical-conceptual logics, allowed sciences to be constructed by working backwards from their objects or goals to the principles and categories required to know them. This enabled Martini to reintroduce metaphysics to the Lutheran philosophy curriculum, but in the limited form of a positive ontology: as the science of ‘being as being’ which included God, but only in terms of bare ‘whatness’ or existence, leaving knowledge of his divine qualities for the separate science of (revealed) theology. Nonetheless, despite the restricted form in which he sought to reintroduce philosophical knowledge of God, Martini was immediately caught up in the anti-scholastic campaign of his Helmstedt colleague Daniel Hofmann.  

71 Seeking to renew Luther’s restriction of knowledge of God to the domain of revelation and faith, Hofmann argued that the central Christian doctrines were not just above philosophical knowledge, but contradicted it, leading him to argue that philosophy and theology acceded to two different kinds of

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truth.\textsuperscript{72} This set the stage for a protracted struggle over the demarcation of theology and philosophy, at the centre of which lay the issue of the formation of the philosophical persona.

Charles Lohr has argued that the Hofmann conflict was a reprise of the original late-medieval ‘two truths’ controversy. This had broken out in the thirteenth century when recently recovered Aristotelian natural philosophy — with its doctrines of the eternity of the world and the mortality of the soul — clashed with Christian doctrine and theology.\textsuperscript{73} According to Lohr, the manner in which Scotist metaphysics had evolved to resolve this conflict — by transcending the world of Aristotelian physics in favour of a doctrine of the immaterial substances underpinning the physical world’s existence — was repeated in seventeenth-century Lutheran metaphysics, which could draw on Suárez’ version of this doctrine to defeat Hofmann’s double-truth arguments.\textsuperscript{74} Lohr’s account, however, is unsatisfactory for two broad reasons. First, Hofmann’s arguments did not represent the clash between an ancient natural philosophy and Christian theology. Rather, they represented the conflict between a new (Lutheran) theology and a longstanding metaphysical philosophy, being focused in the domain of moral anthropology rather than natural philosophy.\textsuperscript{75} Hofmann’s position was centred in his rejection of the claim that university metaphysics could provide philosophical explications for Christian mysteries. Lutheran ‘ubiquity’ metaphysics, for example, purported to explicate the mystery of the Eucharist — that Christ both remains in heaven and is yet present (body and soul) in the Eucharistic host on earth — by providing an account in terms of the exchange of properties between Christ’s divine (spiritual omnipresent) and human (corporeal earthly) natures. Such explications, Hofmann argued, represent a metabasis: the misapplication of principles from one domain of knowledge to the objects in a different domain. More

\textsuperscript{72} See D. Hofmann, \textit{Propositiones de Deo, et Christi tum persona tum officio} (Helmstedt, 1598); and D. Hofmann, \textit{Pro duplici veritate Lutheri a Philosophis impugnata, et ad pudendorum locum ablegata} (Magdeburg, 1600).

\textsuperscript{73} See Lohr, ‘Metaphysics’.


importantly, they fail to grasp that only philosophers who had been reborn as Christians could accede to such mysteries. Christian philosophers did this through a practice of piety leading to salvation, not through a scientific practice such as Euclid used to demonstrate the properties of geometric figures, true though Euclid’s geometry was. Only in the persona of a Christian theologian could one accede to the truths of the Christian faith, and these truths contradicted those to which one acceded in the persona of the philosopher. In short, Hofmann’s double-truth arguments did not represent a clash between philosophy and theology which might be resolved through the elaboration of a metaphysics of intelligible being; for their whole point was to contest the formation of persona being groomed in the university as the bearer of such a metaphysics. Moreover, despite the historical condescension shown to the ‘radical’ and ‘extreme’ Hofmann, his distinctively Lutheran demarcation of the philosophical and theological personae would find a strong echo in such ‘early enlightenment’ programs as Thomasius’s, where it would be used in the desacralisation of law and politics.

Second, when we examine the writings of the Lutheran metaphysicians we are not immediately struck by the presence of the ‘confessionally neutral possible world’, which Lohr claims they derived from Suárez’s metaphysics of intelligible substances. Rather, we find a combative moral anthropology designed to qualify the persona of the philosopher for a particular metaphysical knowledge of God; and, despite the Lutheran reconstruction of it as a positive science, an aggressive use of metaphysics to defend the central doctrines of the Formula of Concord. In his response to Hofmann, Jakob Martini (1570-1649) of Wittenberg, thus begins by constructing an alternative moral anthropology. God created man as the bearer of a dual, animal-corporeal and spiritual-rational nature. Despite its damage at the Fall, this duplex nature is still the means by which man can have natural knowledge of God, reason being God’s image in man. Philosophy, Martini argues, is in fact the partial restoration of man’s damaged rational nature, as we can see with the elaboration of the metaphysical concepts. For, by abstracting from all material finitude, metaphysics allows the formation of the key concepts of being (ens) and entity (entis), without which we could not interpret such

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76 Lohr, ‘Rezeption der aristotelischen Philosophie’, p. 189.
77 J. Martini, Vernunftspiegel (Wittenberg, 1618), Vorrede, n. p.
statements of the Lord as ‘Ero, qui ero’ (I am that I am). Against Hofmann and his followers, this shows that metaphysical philosophy can indeed clarify biblical statements, even if their full knowledge is reserved for revealed truth.\(^78\) In his justification of the teaching of metaphysics in Lutheran universities, Martini’s focus is clearly on the necessity of the central metaphysical themes and terms — being and essence, nature and person, identity and difference — for doing battle with Calvinist Christological and Eucharistic doctrines.\(^79\) Martini thus sought to repel Hofmann and his followers by elaborating a philosophical persona through whose partially restored reason the truths of the Lutheran confession could be better defended than by the mere ‘preacher’. It is not surprising that this dispute was not resolved through the elaboration of a decisively superior philosophy, but by the action of the Duke Heinrich-Julius of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel. The Duke removed Hofmann from his academic post and banned the teaching of Ramist doctrine, in support of the humanist philosophers he had appointed as part of his state-building agenda.\(^80\)

In fact the broad orientation of Lutheran Schulphilosophie was not towards the subordination of the sciences under a Catholic scientia transcendens.\(^81\) But neither was it towards a Calvinist eschatological universal science. Rather, Lutheran academic philosophy was oriented towards the gradual autonomising of the sciences under the aegis of Zabarella’s instrumental theory of proof. This was particularly the case at Helmstedt, where the constraints of the Formula of Concord mattered less than in universities such as Wittenberg, Leipzig and Giessen. Here, following Cornelius Martini’s lead, professors in the philosophy, theology and medical faculties used Zabarella’s method to limit metaphysics to the domain of positive ontology, while simultaneously establishing other positive sciences on an independent basis. Henning Arnisaeus (1575-1636), for example, had written a metaphysics along Martinian lines,

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\(^78\) Martini, Vernunftspiegel, pp. 77-94.
\(^79\) Martini, Vernunftspiegel, pp. 866-72.
but was most known for elaborating a neo-Aristotelian science of politics. In his *Politica* of 1606, Arnisaeus established political order as the practical end of politics and, on this basis, elaborated a complete political science in terms of the expert means needed to secure and maintain such order in the face of diverse threats to the state, those posed by religious civil war in particular. In effect he created a political therapeutics for a cadre of advisers to dukes of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, allowing them a high degree of independence from ethical and religious norms in the application of their scientific expertise. Following in Arnisaeus’s footsteps at Helmstedt, and also trained in medical Aristotelianism, Hermann Conring (1606-1681), further developed the independence of politics as an empirical science aimed at the expert maintenance of political order. By treating the science solely in terms of the principles and actions required by this end, Conring separated politics from moral theology and Christian natural law, establishing a secular discipline open to the concrete history of states. The fact that Conring had read and commented on Descartes, Lipsius, Machiavelli and Hobbes indicates the degree to which Lutheran *Schulpolitik*, developed in this way, began to dissolve itself from within. For these were not academic philosophers transmitting the corporate doctrine of a confessional university or church, but philosophers who in different ways sought to personally warrant their doctrines through an investigation of their own consciousness, or their own observations. It was a short step from here to treating Aristotelianism itself as the teaching of a particular school or sect, allowing new developments within natural and political sciences to enter the universities under the protective umbrella of ‘eclectic philosophy’.

3. Diverse Modernities

Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) were both products of Lutheran *Schulpolitik* during the period of its internal pluralisation and

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83 H. Arnisaeus, *Doctrina politica in genuinam methodum* (Frankfurt, 1606).

84 H. Conring, *De civili prudentia liber unus* (Helmstedt, 1662).

reception of non-scholastic styles of philosophy (Bacon, Descartes, Gassendi, Hobbes, Spinoza). If by ‘modern’ we mean philosophers who attempted to establish scientific disciplines on the basis of concepts and observations for which they took personal responsibility, then both may be regarded as modern philosophers. Such an attribution only makes sense, though, against the relative backdrop provided by scholastic philosophy. Further, the relativity of their modernity becomes all the more apparent when we observe that the two philosophers responded to the break-up of Lutheran Schulphilosophie in markedly different ways and, in doing so, gave shape to opposed versions of modern philosophy and the modern philosopher.

Pufendorf turned away from the entire tradition of metaphysically-oriented academic philosophy, raking it with polemic as he did so. Aided in part by his critical reception of Hobbes, he sought to shift the intellectual centre of gravity from metaphysical to political philosophy, using a radically reconstructed system of natural law in order to reshape the topography of philosophy around the ethical and intellectual requirements of civil life in a secular state. Pufendorf carried out this work in his capacities as professor of natural and international law, and as court historian and political adviser to the absolute Protestant states of Sweden and Brandenburg-Prussia. Leibniz, who did not pursue an academic career and became instead a court savant and political adviser to the (Catholic) archbishopric of Mainz (1667-1716) and the middle-size (mostly Lutheran) court of Hanover (1676-1698), responded to the intellectual circumstances he shared with Pufendorf in a quite different way. Gathering up diverse threads from the entire history of early modern metaphysics, he sought to fashion a metaphysical philosophy capable of absorbing all of the new developments in natural and moral philosophy, from Galileo and Newton to Descartes and Spinoza. Leibniz’s goal was to improvise an updated philosophia Christiana which would form the basis of a reunited church and a rejuvenated empire. Both writers would have a major impact on the teaching of philosophy and the persona of the philosopher, even if Leibniz’s influence had to wait until Christian Wolff arrived on the academic scene, and even if their influence was restricted to the Empire’s Protestant territories, owing to the impermeability of Jesuit Schulphilosophie — a further reason for relativising the notion of modern philosophy. In sketching the radically different styles of philosophy elaborated by Pufendorf and
Leibniz, we will thus gain an insight into rival programs for remodeling the deportment and capacities of the philosopher, both intended to be ‘post-combatant’ in relation to the period of warring confessional *Schulphilosophien*, yet each caught up within the religious and political conflicts characteristic of the post-Westphalian German Empire.

### 3.1. Pufendorf and the Reconstruction of Natural law

The discipline through which Pufendorf sought to reconstruct academic philosophy, and open it to extra-academic developments in moral and political philosophy, was natural law — the doctrine that moral laws are immanent to man’s nature and accessible via natural reason. Natural law was important in Thomist moral theology, where it played a mediating role between God’s eternal law and the positive laws of states, and also in Protestant *philosophia Christiana*, where its superiority to positive civil law was secured by deducing it from man’s prelapsarian condition or his rational *imago Dei*. By the middle of the seventeenth century, however, natural law had been significantly transformed by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) — who had made man’s need for worldly sociability central to the derivation of natural law — and by the development of European *jus publicum*, which had made the legal needs of the emerging state order paramount. In his two major natural law works — the massive *De jure naturae et gentium* (1672) and its student digest, the *De officio hominis et civis* (1673) — Pufendorf continued this line of development, launching a corrosive assault on scholastic and Christian natural law, and radicalising Grotius’s sociability principle, in part through the reception of Hobbes.

The tenor and a good deal of the foundation for Pufendorf’s reconstruction are provided in the *entia moralia* doctrine with which he begins the *De jure*. Man cannot

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govern his ‘dangerous liberty’ unaided and, to keep his conduct within the bounds required for a decent civil life, entia moralia or moral entities have been instituted for him, as the forms in which he is to bear duties.⁸⁹ Pufendorf measures his detachment from the scholastic and Christian natural law traditions via an analogy: just as corporeal substances occupy physical space and unfold their properties there, so moral entities occupy moral space. The space occupied by moral entities is not that of the created (physical or metaphysical) substance, but that of the imposed status, understood by Pufendorf as a moral condition in which men are placed in order to become capable of certain classes of actions, and subject to particular arrays of duties. The significance of the statuses being imposed is that the moral entities they contain — most centrally the moral personae required by civil and religious life — are regarded as instituted or conventional, rather than as essence- or substance-like. (They are thus to be contrasted with such things as ens rationis, man’s ‘rational and sociable nature’, and the imago Dei).

This anti-metaphysical optic is applied first to man’s moral nature which, despite being created by God, is still regarded as an instituted status — the status naturalis — imposed gratuitously by divine will, rather than rationally in accordance with a divine understanding.⁹⁰ As the product of a gratuitous act of the divine will — rather than of rational laws binding on the divine understanding — man’s moral persona is not capable of governing itself through a reason shared with God. There is no rational ‘spark’ of divinity permitting man to partially recover his community with God through the exercise of metaphysical reason. Rather, man’s moral nature must be viewed independently of all (claimed) metaphysical access to divine reason, as an object of entirely worldly powers of observation and understanding.⁹¹ With this set of opening moves, Pufendorf closed the scholastic-metaphysical portal to the divine rational nature through which Christian theology was channeled into natural law. In its place, he opened a path to a quasi-

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⁹⁰ ‘We call a state of man natural, not because without any imposition it derives from the physical principles of the essence of man, but because it arises from the imposition of the Divine Will, not from the determination of men, and accompanies man from the very moment of his birth’. Pufendorf, De jure, I.i.7, p. 7.

⁹¹ Pufendorf, De jure, I.iii.3, pp. 39-40; II.iii.13-14, pp. 201-7.
Hobbesian or Epicurean state of nature, understood as the observable condition in which man found himself, and from which the natural law could be scientifically derived.

Against this broad line of interpretation, Horst Dreitzel has recently sought to minimise the significance of the entia moralia doctrine, claiming that it plays little role in the body of the De jure. Dreitzel argues that the account of imposed personae conflicts with Pufendorf’s own moral anthropology (which requires man’s moral freedom and responsibility), his conception of God’s imposition of natural law (which gives rise to inborn natural rights), and his account of entrance into the civil state (which requires the sovereignty to remain conditional on respecting such rights).92 On Dreitzel’s view, Pufendorf’s reception of Hobbes is strictly circumscribed, to his broad acceptance of Hobbes’s non-metaphysical anthropology as the basis of natural law. Dreitzel’s Pufendorf insists against Hobbes that justice and right obtain in state of nature, and that the state arises not as a fear-driven delegation of sovereignty by individuals seeking peace alone, but from the contractual relations of the pact through which men seek to protect their natural rights in the civil state.93 As Dreitzel himself says about this interpretation: ‘If one assembles the consequences for the state that Pufendorf draws from the doctrine of natural law, the impression arises that in this regard he stands nearer to Locke than Hobbes and even than Grotius.94

Despite the richness of Dreitzel’s account, however, there are good grounds for questioning his minimisation of the entia moralia doctrine and the larger interpretation of Pufendorf’s natural law that he draws from this. In the first place, the entia moralia doctrine is central to Pufendorf’s construction of a scientific method for natural law and his consequent argument for the certainty of moral knowledge. It is by regarding man’s moral condition as gratuitously imposed that Pufendorf suspends metaphysical forms of deducing natural law, from man’s ‘rational and sociable nature’, his prelapsarian innocent condition, the imago Dei, and similar. And this enables him to treat man’s moral condition as an observable state of affairs, containing an end — sociability — from

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94 Dreitzel, ‘Samuel Pufendorf’, p. 792.
which natural law can be derived as the means, following the ‘geometric’ model of Zabarella. Not only does this allow Pufendorf to use French and English Epicureans (Montaigne, Charron, Hobbes) to determine the character of man’s natural moral condition — that of a creature who must be sociable to survive yet whose uncontrollable passions threaten mutual destruction — but it also ensures that man’s reason will not itself be treated as normative. For, under these circumstances, the role of reason is only to deduce the rules required to render such a creature sociable, not to recover norms that it shares with divine reason and, in doing so, make man rationally self-governing.

Second, for this reason, divine law in Pufendorf gives rise to obligation and rights only indirectly. This occurs via the Epicurean moral anthropology which God has imposed, and from within which man derives rules of sociability. Man comes to regard these rules as divinely imposed post facto, because they are necessary for his survival and God must be presumed to will his creature’s survival. Hence, while it is indeed true that Pufendorf insists that the natural law exists in the state of nature — criticising Hobbes’s vision of the unbridled state of war — it is no less true that he regards the law and its duties in these circumstances as virtual rather than real, and as incapable of supporting rights. Were man capable of doing his duty in the state of nature — that is, prior to the institution of an authority over him — he would in effect be rationally self-governing, but this is impossible; for, no less than Hobbes, Pufendorf regards man as a creature who needs a master. The decisive crux here is Pufendorf’s formulation of obligation. Law differs from advice, agreement and right because it imposes an obligation. But obligation can only be imposed by a ‘superior’, who is in turn understood in terms of the combination of coercive power and ‘just cause’: ‘An obligation is properly laid on the mind of man by a superior, that is, by one who has both the strength to threaten some evil against those who resist him, and just reasons [justa causae] why he can demand that the liberty of our will be limited at his pleasure’. In the De officio Pufendorf clarifies the nature of these reasons in the following way: ‘The reasons which justify a person’s claims to another’s obedience are: if he has conferred exceptional benefits on him; if it is evident that he wishes the other well and can look out for him better than he can for himself; if at the same time he actually claims direction of him; and, finally, if the other

95 Pufendorf, De jure, I.vi.9, p. 95.
party has voluntarily submitted to him and accepted his direction. These of course are the relations of the political pact. But here Pufendorf locates them (along with coercion) as the joint source of obligation and right, which means that the participants to the pact do not already possess (natural) rights, and that justice does not exist in the state of nature, even if the natural law does in some virtual sense. Ultimately the pact is the effective source of natural law and God only its honorific author. This leaves Pufendorf free to entertain the Hobbesian ideas that it is indeed fear rather than reason that underpins the pact, and that it is peace rather than justice that lies at the bottom of the natural law: ‘For it is not required for a society to be said to be in harmony with nature that it have been formed on the basis of mutual good-will alone’.

Third, the entia moralia doctrine is central to Pufendorf’s way of handling the transition from the natural to the civil status, as it allows him to treat this in terms of the imposition of new moral personae — those of the citizen and the sovereign — bearing new duties and rights. Pufendorf’s treatment of entry to the civil state in terms of imposed personae is targeted squarely on all accounts that view this as a means of perfecting man’s ‘rational and sociable nature’ — the Aristotelian doctrine of the zoon politikon being the most notable — and which thereby make the state accountable to this moral role. Siding explicitly and unequivocally with Hobbes, Pufendorf argues that it is not man’s reason or sociability that leads him to enter the state-forming pact, but mutual fear. The role of the political pact is thus not to execute pre-existing rights at the level of the state; it is to change the manner in which men are subject to obligations:

For one thing is sure, namely, that every state had at some time its beginning. And yet it was necessary that those who compose a state be not held together before its establishment by the same bond as they are afterwards; and that they be not subject to the same persons to whom they are afterwards. Yet since it is impossible to understand that union and subjection without the

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96 Pufendorf, *De officio*, I.i.5, p. 28.
97 Pufendorf, *De jure*, II.i.18, p. 215.
above-mentioned pacts, they must have interposed, tacitly at least, in the formation of states.\textsuperscript{101}

The new bond resulting from the pact is that contained in the personae of citizen and sovereign it imposes, and it consists in the exchange of obedience for protection. The pact originates in man’s natural condition — that is, in his need for peace — but is not an expression of his moral nature. Driven into the pact by fear, the assembled individuals give up their capacity for judging how to achieve security to another agent, creating the sovereign and themselves as subjects. In so doing, they transform their own mode of subjection to the natural law, whose concrete form will now be determined by the sovereign in his capacity as supreme legislator in the civil state. In arguing that men can already distinguish between just and unjust prior to the establishment of the civil sovereign, Pufendorf indeed differs from Hobbes. Yet, in making the sovereign sole arbiter of what counts as just or unjust in the civil state — that is, how the public good is to be obtained through civil laws — Pufendorf sides with Hobbes in denying that political obligation is conditional on individuals agreeing with the sovereign.\textsuperscript{102} For it was just this capacity for independent judgment on such matters that they gave up on entering the state and assuming the persona of citizen, so that the difference from Hobbes here is nugatory.

Pufendorf’s program for dissolving the basic structures and redistributing the contents of Protestant \textit{Schulphilosophie} was thus extraordinarily ambitious. In rejecting its founding metaphysical premises — according to which reason itself is normative for man because of its connection to divine understanding — he advanced a different style of philosophy. This was oriented to understanding man as subject to norms imposed by that artificial person he had constructed in order to protect himself from himself. The philosopher required by this kind of philosophy would be one who renounced all attempts to participate in divine thinking — whether in the form of Jakob Martini’s angelic reason or Alsted’s eschatological universal science — and who accepted that philosophical understanding itself was immanent to the empirical nature that God had imposed on man for no apparent reason. In shifting the centre of gravity of philosophy

\textsuperscript{101} Pufendorf, \textit{De jure}, VII.ii.8, p. 977.
\textsuperscript{102} Pufendorf, \textit{De jure}, VIII.i.5, pp. 1138-40.
from metaphysics to politics, Pufendorf consigned theology to a separate domain, on the
grounds that natural law is concerned only with the grounds of man’s external conduct in
civil life as accessible to natural reason, while theology concerns itself with man’s inner
purity and salvation in accordance with Christian revelation.\textsuperscript{103}

Unlike Hobbes, however, Pufendorf did not include religion within the civil state or
place it at the disposition of the sovereign, arguing instead that it was a wholly separate
domain, with its own end (eternal happiness), laws (the law of love), and personae (those
of teacher and learner). As formally disjunct moral domains, religion and politics had to
be practically separated, which meant both that religion had to be excluded from all
exercise of civil sovereignty, and that the sovereign could not exercise civil power in the
church, where he existed only as a teacher or learner.\textsuperscript{104} This formed the basis of a
conception of religious toleration and political desacralisation that would be further
elaborated by Thomasius.\textsuperscript{105} Natural religion did form part of natural law, but was wholly
subordinate to its ends and method, having nothing to do with salvation and consisting of
a doctrinal minimum open to natural reason and required to help cultivate sociability.\textsuperscript{106}

For their part, the public churches should be regarded as ‘colleges’; that is, as voluntary
civil associations free to pursue their various doctrines, but only within the parameters set
by the state for the maintenance of civil peace. The public churches must thus be
regarded from a purely political point of view, in terms of their advantages or
disadvantages for the state. And from this viewpoint the Catholic church was a threat
because it represented the interests of a foreign sovereign, while the Protestant churches
could be an advantage, to the extent that their hierarchy remained national and their
doctrines could be reconciled with the political imperatives of a sovereign territorial

\textsuperscript{103} Pufendorf, \textit{De officio}, pref., pp. 8-11.
\textsuperscript{104} S. Pufendorf, \textit{Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion in Reference to Civil Society}
(1687) (Indianapolis, 2002).
\textsuperscript{105} See the penetrating discussion in M. J. Seidler, ‘The Politics of Self-Preservation:
Toleration and Identity in Pufendorf and Locke’, in T. J. Hochstrasser and P. Schröder,
ed., \textit{Early Modern Natural Law Theories: Contexts and Strategies in the Early
\textsuperscript{106} Pufendorf, \textit{De officio}, Liv, pp. 39-45.
In short, despite Pufendorf’s Lutheran allegiance, he showed how academic philosophy could be placed on a non-confessional civil footing.

Protestant Schulphilosophie, however, did not simply vanish at Pufendorf’s touch. In fact during the final third of the seventeenth century it witnessed a significant (if ultimately short-lived) revival, in the form of a Christian natural law refurbished to deal with the threat posed by Pufendorf and Hobbes. Christian natural law was largely elaborated by university theologians (but also some jurists and philosophers), and represented a longstanding campaign to subordinate politics to law by treating positive law as normatively governed by Christian (sometimes neo-Platonic) moral theology. Despite its diversity of forms, Christian natural law shared a common rejection of the principle of sociality in the form this had been developed by Hobbes and Pufendorf — that is, as a principle which allowed natural law to be derived from the end of worldly security and to be thereby aligned with the sovereign’s positive law. For the Christian philosophers were fully aware that this not only wrecked the confessional-pedagogical premises of Protestant Schulphilosophie, it also undermined the theocratic aspiration of the agenda to subordinate positive law to a natural law based in Christian metaphysics and biblical laws.

In developing their opposed principles, the Christian philosophers trawled through the entire heritage of Schulphilosophie, arriving at a variety of overlapping doctrinal forms. All, however, were intended to undo the damage done by Hobbes and Pufendorf, by showing that human reason was itself normative, as a result of its capacity to accede to divine reason. David Mevius (1609-1670) and Samuel Rachel (1628-1691) thus returned to a mix of Aristotelian and Christian ideas, treating Aristotle’s ‘rational and sociable nature’ as equivalent to man’s nature in the state of innocence (status integritatis), and using this to derive natural law from divine law, on the assumption that

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those reborn in Christ had regained their lost purity of reason and will. Valentin Alberti (1635-1697) also used the status integritatis and imago Dei doctrines to attack Pufendorf, arguing that reason was the imago Dei, and that conforming to it both revealed what natural law is and enabled men to act in accordance with it. In identifying access to natural law with the restoration of a lost purity of reason and will, this approach was grounded in the cultivation of a philosophical persona radically at odds with Pufendorf’s. It also supported a politics — grounded in inalienable subjective rights — quite opposed to his derivation of obligation from the commands of the sovereign. For his part, Johann Zentgrav (1643-1707), a Lutheran professor of philosophy at Strasbourg, drew on neo-Platonic sources to ground natural law in the conformation of rational creatures to the divine intellect from which they flowed. Zentgrav used this doctrine to attack Pufendorf’s account of God’s gratuitous imposition of man’s moral nature which, he rightly saw, allowed only an empirical and not an absolute grounding of natural law. This allowed him to posit Christian caritas as a superior principle to Pufendorf’s sociality, as caritas represents a higher form of community, embracing man’s community with God, the source of the universal justice from which natural and then positive law could be derived.

We can conclude by noting that the political aspirations associated with Christian natural law — theocratic, corporatist, associational — meant that in the short term it was no match for Pufendorf’s ethics for the citizens of the emerging absolute territorial state. At the same time, however, many of the themes and concerns of these Christian philosophers would find their way into Leibniz’s quite different reconstruction of philosophy; and through this they would be granted access to a modernity shaped in their own image.

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112 J. J. Zentgrav, *De Origine, Veritate et immutabili Rectitudine Juris Naturalis secundum disciplinam Christianorum* (Strasbourg, 1678).
3.2. Leibniz’s Modern Christian Philosophy

Despite being little known in his own time — in comparison with Pufendorf, for example — Gottfried Leibniz has been received by modern commentators in a bewildering variety of forms: as the rescuer of Aristotelian metaphysics, the anticipator of modern axiomatics and possible-worlds logic, an architect of religious ecumenism, an adept in esoteric sciences, and the prophet of a reunited Europe. In our panorama, though, Leibniz appears in a somewhat different light which, while not denying these other avatars, reorders them in relation to a different centre of gravity. For, in relation to the history we have been sketching, Leibniz occupies a quite particular position. He appears as a product of Lutheran Schulphilosophie who reacted to its internal dissolution and external rivals not by moving to a post-metaphysical position, but by improvising a new metaphysically-oriented philosophy. This was designed to absorb the challenges posed by Hobbes and Newton, and would itself eventually feed into a new Schulmetaphysik. Moreover, Leibniz undertook this program not as an academic but in the persona of savant and political adviser to the middle-sized imperial courts of Mainz and Hanover. In this milieu, the combination of intellectual entrepreneurship and patronal demands resulted in the plethora of (often unfinished) Leibnizian projects, orbiting his metaphysics at different distances. His metaphysical focus, together with his role as adviser to a Catholic prince-bishop (Elector Johann Philipp von Schönborn of Mainz) and then to a Lutheran dynasty seeking imperial electoral status (the Welfish house of the dukes of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel), meant that Leibniz’s philosophy unfolded in a different

113 P. Petersen, Geschichte der aristotelischen Philosophie im protestantischen Deutschland (Leipzig, 1921).
116 A. Coudert, Leibniz and the Kabbalah (Dordrecht, 1995).
118 I am unaware of any study of Leibniz’s court milieu comparable to Mario Biagioli’s study of Galileo’s: M. Biagioli, Galileo Courtier: The Practice of Science in the Culture of Absolutism (Chicago, 1993).
religious and political register to Pufendorf’s. If Pufendorf sought to reorganise the landscape of philosophy around the political, ethical and religious requirements of life in a secularised territorial sovereign state, then Leibniz developed his metaphysics as a Christian rationalism oriented to a supra-territorial empire and church. The persona of the philosopher varied accordingly.

Leibniz’s metaphysical philosophy can appear exotic, yet it falls into place when seen as an improvised assemblage of concepts and themes from across the spectrum of early modern metaphysics. The base notion continues to be academic philosophy’s theory of being, understood in terms of rational substances created by God in accordance with fundamental laws of compossibility, and capable of actualisation as the material world in accordance with the divine will.119 This common stock was transformed, however, through the grafting of key themes from the Lullist tradition, and from hermetic and neo-Platonic philosophy. Leibniz was familiar with Alsted’s work, and developed a similar pansophic conception of an ‘ars magna’ or ‘universal characteristic’. This was grounded in the idea of a fundamental set of divine predicates whose ‘compossible’ combinations determined the entirety of what could be thought (by God and man), hence what was logically possible.120 The fact that God knows the simple concepts and their combinations intuitively and immediately, while man only discursively through characters or symbols, gives Leibniz’s universal combinatoric its eschatological edge. For Leibniz regarded the calculus of symbols as man’s way of generating the entirety of thinkable things in a universal language. Further, this idea supported Leibniz’s utopian project for a scientific society (analogous to the Royal Society) whose role would be to complete this task as a prelude to a general reform of society.

It was Leibniz’s adaptation of hermetic neo-Platonism, though, that proved most decisive for his transformation of Schulmetaphysik, and for the legal, theological and political doctrines he would develop on this basis. Through neo-Platonism, Leibniz developed the Aristotelian concept of substance into the hermetically inspired concept of the monad. Leibniz’s monads are the immortal beings or ‘spiritual atoms’ emanating

120 G. W. Leibniz, Dissertatio de arte combinatoria (1666).
from divine intellection and filling the universe.\textsuperscript{121} Part logical subject, part metaphysical substance and part spiritual being, the monads receive their predicates — which include all of their properties and all of the events that will befall them in time — through divine intellection, and are ‘windowless’ in the sense that all of their ‘perceptions’ are unfoldings of these internal predicates.\textsuperscript{122} Because the universe of monads form a plenum in which all are contiguous, each is capable of reflecting the entirety of the universe from its particular viewpoint. Further, and crucial for the theological dimension of this metaphysics, the monads form a spiritual hierarchy. At the bottom of this are the inanimate or ‘slumbering’ monads, which combine to form bodies and remain unconscious of the divine source of the predicates they bear.\textsuperscript{123} At the top are the spiritual monads or intelligent souls, defined by the fact that they have become conscious of the divine intellection unfolding in them — which they ‘remember’ in the manner of Platonic anamnesis — and are thus able to know God in a special way as the lord of a moral kingdom.\textsuperscript{124} God maintains the monads in existence through ‘continual outflashings of the divinity from moment to moment’.\textsuperscript{125} This means that rational monads are able to participate in the divine intellection of the ‘perfections’, limited by their finite nature, which is nonetheless capable of continuous perfection through divine imitation. Because the monads are not ordered by physical causation, it is God’s role to pre-establish their harmonic relations. In the first instance God ensures agreement between the self-enclosed ‘perceptions’ of the monads, and then between the external mechanical world (how monads appear from the outside) and the internal spontaneous spiritual world (how they are internally).\textsuperscript{126} In his \textit{Theodicy}, Leibniz argues that God does this by choosing the ‘best possible world’ — that is, the one with the greatest degree of harmony from among the logically possible worlds. This reduces the problem of evil to that of the imperfection

\textsuperscript{122} Leibniz, ‘Monadology’, § 7-15.
\textsuperscript{123} Leibniz, ‘Monadology’, § 17-24.
\textsuperscript{124} Leibniz, ‘Monadology’, § 29 ff; ‘Discourse’, § 33-37.
\textsuperscript{125} Leibniz, ‘Monadology’, § 47 ff.
\textsuperscript{126} Leibniz, ‘Monadology’, § 49-55.
arising in the perception of monads as a result of their ‘distance’ from their divine progenitor.\(^\text{127}\)

Leibniz’s monadology is a fully-fledged neo-Platonic natural theology. In refusing to allow for a separate ontology, the monadology affiliates not to the Lutheran but to the Calvinist style of *Schulphilosophie*, whose gnoseological, pansophic and eschatological tendencies it shares to varying degrees. Taking advantage of the milieu of the early modern German court — the natural home of hermetic neo-Platonism\(^\text{128}\) — Leibniz self-consciously rejected the divorce of philosophy from theology advanced by Pufendorf and Thomasius, and the separation of reason and faith found in Bayle. Instead, he elaborated his metaphysics as a philosophical theology aimed at turning back the advance of secularised philosophy and establishing a modern version of *philosophia Christiana*. For, as Walter Sparn has argued, if Leibniz departed from Lutheran tradition by subordinating theology to a neo-Platonic philosophy, then he simultaneously imbued this philosophy with crucial elements of Christian doctrine: not just the conception of God as a divine being revealing himself through the creation of the universe, but the conception of the monads as ‘little Christs’, whose dual divine and human nature has the role of mediating the divinity to humanity.\(^\text{129}\) Leibniz’s natural theology also held the key to his defence of the normativity of reason, which he advanced against the methodological conceptions of reason found in Hobbes, Descartes and Pufendorf. For Leibniz, reason is man’s mode of participating in divine intellection, to which it is joined through the processes of emanation and imitation. Leibniz thus used a version of the *imago Dei* doctrine, grounding it in the duplex anthropology of the intelligent monads. This allowed him to treat passive sensation as symptomatic of the monad’s confused perception of ideas, which would appear clearly and distinctly only in the form of self-revealing pure

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concepts ‘recollected’ from within.\textsuperscript{130} Leibniz’s anthropology may thus be regarded as a means of spiritual grooming for a particular kind of philosophical persona: one who relates to himself as the harbinger of a divinely transcendent reason to which he conforms through the practice of metaphysical philosophy, which is thus the highest form of moral life.

Unfolding in this metaphysical space, Leibniz’s natural law doctrine shared the central goals and themes of late seventeenth-century Christian natural law: namely, the subordination of the sovereign’s positive law to Christian theological norms acceded to via the rational \textit{imago Dei}.\textsuperscript{131} Despite his occasional proposals for the rationalisation of legal teaching and procedure, Leibniz’s was a natural law for theologians and Christian philosophers rather than jurists; even if his defence of Christian and Roman law did have a certain ideological fit with such political entities as the Mainz archbishopric, where church and empire continued to inform territorial jurisdiction. The cross-over from Leibniz’s metaphysics to his natural law is provided by the fundamental thought-figure of the universe as a community of intelligences held together by the laws of divine reason. As the intelligent monads are capable of participating in this reason and conforming themselves to the divine likeness, so they are joined in a single society ruled by God:

84. Therefore, spirits are able to enter into a sort of social relationship with God, and with respect to them he is not only what an inventor is to his machine (as is his relation to other created things), but he is also what a prince is to his subjects, and even what a father is to his children.

85. Whence it is easy to conclude that the totality of all the spirits must compose the city of God, that is to say, the most perfect state that is possible under the most perfect monarch.\textsuperscript{132}

With this figure, Leibniz was able to formulate the conception of universal justice, understood as the governance of a society of intelligences in accordance with the laws of divine reason.\textsuperscript{133} And this provided him with the intellectual weaponry to combat

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{130}] Leibniz, ‘Discourse’, § XXIII-XXVI.
\item[\textsuperscript{131}] See, in particular, Schneider, \textit{Justitia Universalis}.
\item[\textsuperscript{132}] Leibniz, ‘Monadology’, § 84-5.
\item[\textsuperscript{133}] For a helpful overview, see P. Riley, \textit{Leibniz' Universal Jurisprudence: Justice as the Charity of the Wise} (Cambridge Mass., 1996).
\end{itemize}
Hobbes’s and Pufendorf’s conception of justice as arising from the command of a superior:

There must be, then, a certain justice — or rather supreme justice — in God, even though no one is superior to him, and he, by the spontaneity of his excellent nature, accomplishes all things well, such that no one can reasonably complain of him. Neither the norm of conduct itself, nor the essence of the just, depends on his free decision, but rather on eternal truths, objects of the divine intellect, which constitute, so to speak, the essence of divinity itself; and it is right that our author [Pufendorf] is reproached by theologians when he maintains the contrary; because, I believe, he had not seen the wicked consequences which arise from it.\(^\text{134}\)

Formulated in this way, universal justice is the sum of all the virtues and, as a result, Leibniz’s natural law doctrine unfolds in two registers at the same time: jurisprudence and moral philosophy. Adapting Ulpian’s standard Roman law precepts — hurt no-one (\textit{neminem laedere}), give each his due (\textit{suum cuique tribuere}), live honourably (\textit{honeste vivere}) — Leibniz thus constructed a natural law hierarchy. This begins at the level of strict justice (which he identified with the empirical theories of Hobbes and Pufendorf), rises to the intermediary level of distributive justice (which Leibniz saw in terms of the state converting mutual benevolence into mutual rights), and culminates in the command to live piously. Here, love becomes truly disinterested and justice passes beyond the level of the state to be enacted in accordance with God’s rational governance of the society of intelligences.\(^\text{135}\) At the same time, this juridical hierarchy was a moral one, as its lowest level was identified with self-interest and prudence, whereas its pinnacle was identified with the wisdom and disinterested love flowing from the rational soul’s participation in the theo-rational ordering of the society of intelligences.

Leibniz thus grounded the entire order of universal justice in the formula \textit{justitita est caritas sapientis} — justice is the love of the sage — which he regarded not as deduction from observed circumstances or desired ends, but as an apodictic combination of


underivable concepts revealed in the purified mind of the sage himself.\textsuperscript{136} Love is defined as disinterested pleasure in the happiness of others, while the sage’s wisdom consists in his clarified participation in the laws through which God harmonises the universal society of intelligent monads. Channeling divinely normative reason into the political community, the sage is metaphysically qualified to determine the harmonising distribution of rights to the members of society and, through the prince, to punish those whose incapacity for rational self-governance leads them to infringe the rights of others. At this point the persona of the metaphysical philosopher annexes the attributes of a Platonic philosopher-king, as Leibniz envisages the alternative to the Hobbesian-Pufendorfian state in the form of a \textit{Vernunftstaat}. Here, the laws are in accord with divine reason, and society is governed by a scholarly elite through a network of scientific societies, religious orders, and educational institutions. Leibniz’s metaphysics thus enabled him to adapt the theocratic aspirations of Christian natural law to the image of a post-confessional \textit{respublica Christiana} ruled by a cadre of Christian philosophers.

Finally, with regards to Leibniz’s positive theology — that his, the theology he developed in the context of his strategy for the reunification of the church — we find a similar use of his metaphysics to elaborate doctrines and projects within the fluid milieu of a middle-sized imperial court. Leibniz pursued his project for the restitution of a single ‘catholic’ (universal) church during his years as political adviser to the Hanoverian court. Here his ecumenical interlocutors were Gerard Wolter Molan(us) — abbot of Locum and head of the Lutheran consistory — and Rojas y Spanola, the Emperor’s tireless campaigner for a reunification of the divided faiths under Catholic aegis.\textsuperscript{137} Leibniz’s strategy was based on the churches coming to agree on a common metaphysical theology — supplied by Leibniz himself — on the basis of which they could gradually discard the inessential conflicting aspects of their rites and liturgies and arrive at a common form of worship.\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{136} Leibniz, ‘Codex’, pp. 170-171.
\textsuperscript{138} Fine accounts are provided in S. Edel, ‘Leibniz als Philosoph der Kirchenunion: Das Mysterium des Abendmahls im Licht der
Leibniz’s main elaboration of this theology — the *Systema theologicum*, written c. 1686 but not published until 1860 — thus begins with a short summary of his *Discourse on Metaphysics*, concentrating on the emanation of all substances from the divine mind, before proceeding to show how this could clarify and reconcile all of the outstanding sacramental and liturgical conflicts dividing Catholics, Lutherans and Calvinists. In his discussion of crux issue of the mode of Christ’s presence in the Eucharistic host — crucial because all confessional parties regarded the Eucharistic community as the core of the civil community — Leibniz explicitly sides with Aristotle and Aquinas against modern physics, by arguing that the substances of the host could change even though their physical properties remained the same. This is because, according to his metaphysics, the inner spiritual essences of substances and their outer spatio-temporal accidents are held together by divine reason and will (doctrine of pre-established harmony). God may thus substitute the substances of Christ’s body and blood for those of the bread and wine, whose physical accidents remain unchanged. On this basis, Leibniz declares that the Calvinists are wrong to treat the Eucharist as a purely symbolic memorial rite, while the Lutherans are wrong to locate the transformation of the host at the moment of consumption, allowing him to endorse the Catholic view of transubstantiation as occurring at the moment of priestly consecration of the host. Rejecting all attempts to deal with such divisive and blood-stained doctrine by declaring them to be *adiaphora* (indifferent with regard to salvation), Leibniz’s metaphysical outlook compelled him to ground the Eucharistic community in a true doctrine, even if in doing so it rendered his reunion project utopian.

Leibniz’s political theology contrasts with Pufendorf’s in several regards. Pufendorf, we recall, executes a radical anti-metaphysical separation of theology and philosophy in his natural law works, and rejects all attempts to provide philosophical explications of Christian doctrine as dangerous to both state and church. On this basis, in the *De habitu* he provided the intellectual architecture for a complete separation of the religious and political communities, opening the way to a political conception of toleration in which

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diverse churches are accepted as ‘colleges’ within a desacralised state, to the extent that they do not undermine its security. In the *Jus feciale*, a strategic text written to advance a reconciliation between Lutheranism and Calvinism within Brandenburg-Prussia, he maintained this conception of political toleration, but also elaborated a doctrine of ecclesial toleration. Ecclesial toleration occurs when aligned churches tolerate inessential doctrinal differences while agreeing on foundations, and it can lead to reconciliation, which is based not on a philosophical theology but on a shared faith in the core teachings of the Bible. Catholics are to be granted political toleration but not ecclesial, as their religion is so focused on allegedly saving rituals that it does not touch the conscience and degenerates into a form of priestcraft.

Predictably, Leibniz attacked the *Jus feciale* as philosophically superficial, and as insulting to Calvinists and offensive to Catholics. Yet the *Jus feciale* was indicative of the shift in the centre of gravity of Protestant intellectual culture from metaphysics to political philosophy. It was also symptomatic of Pufendorf’s role as political adviser to a major territorial state seeking to unite Calvinism and Lutheranism in order to make common cause against international Catholicism. Similarly, while Leibniz’s metaphysically-driven reunion theology seems utopian by comparison, it made a degree of political sense in the Hanoverian court of the 1680s; for at that time the nominally Protestant dukes were bidding for the status of imperial electors, and thus needed to show their openness to imperial and papal interests in this regard. By the late 1690s, however, the house of Welf was positioning itself to assume the British crown, which meant that it had to keep its Protestant credentials burnished. Hanoverian *Religionspolitik* thus had to walk a fine line between the openness to Catholicism required by its imperial attachments and the fealty to Protestantism demanded by its British ambitions. Similarly,

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141 Pufendorf, *Religion in Relation to Civil Society*.
the Hanoverian court had to balance its desire for electoral status, which required submission to imperial *auctoritas*, and its ambitions for independent territorial statehood. These were the circumstances in which Leibniz found the leeway to harness a renovated academic metaphysics to a positive theology oriented to the restitution of a universal church and empire; even if Hanoverian and imperial *Realpolitik* soon turned this evocation of a vanished scholasticism into nostalgia in the Protestant territories.

**Concluding Remarks**

Thomasius’s program for a post-scholastic curriculum is indicative of the degree to which Pufendorf’s reconstruction of philosophy had transformed Protestant academic culture by the end of the seventeenth century, at least in a new university like Halle (1694). Looking back from his newly historicist standpoint, Thomasius grasped a central fact about German *Schulphilosophie*: it had been deeply informed by confessional imperatives and was complicit in the two centuries of religious conflict. Nonetheless, Thomasius was too closely identified with the displacement of *Schulphilosophie* to be a reliable guide to it. Similarly, at the end of the eighteenth century, Kant and his followers would not be reliable guides to the philosophy of Pufendorf and Thomasius, for the same reason. Looking back from the perspective of the new critical philosophy, the Kantians would divide all prior philosophies into the reciprocally deficient camps of empiricism and rationalism, voluntarism and intellectualism, whose transcending reconciliation would be found in a philosophy of the transcendental conditions of subjective experience. The alternative sketch of seventeenth-century German philosophy offered in this paper is aimed at displacing Kantian historiography.

At the centre of our sketch we find not the philosophical subject but a variety of ways of determining what is to count as philosophy, which are simultaneously ways of grooming the philosopher. Seventeenth-century German *Schulphilosophie* was neither empiricist nor rationalist because it was not engaged in an attempt to discover the conditions of a subject’s experience. Rather, working with the Christian-Aristotelian heritage and the recovered classical philosophies of the Renaissance, it represented a series of rival confessional attempts to transmit true doctrine, from across the entire field of knowledge, to students whose comportment was bound to the offices they would
occupy in confessional societies. The bearer of this doctrine was not the subject of experience but the philosophical persona, which we can understand in terms of the cultivation of an intellectual deportment required to accede to the truth, as this was severally understood in the rival confessional cultures. Philosophy was of course understood as natural or non-revealed knowledge, yet because this demarcation was itself determined by theology, the place of philosophy in the curriculum was dependent on instituted theological truths and their associated devotional practices. Unlike the English and French cases, the multiplication of independent confessional-political entities within the German Empire meant that three rival university systems developed, each with its own way of integrating philosophical knowledge and theological doctrine. The three kinds of university philosophy that emerged from this peculiar set of circumstances represented not different philosophical doctrines, but different institutional ways of determining what should count as philosophy and what a philosopher should be.

This is the light in which we should view the integration of Aristotelian disciplines and Thomist theology in the Jesuit Ratio studiorum; the integration of metaphysics and the liberal arts in Calvinist eschatological-encyclopedic Schulphilosophie; and the complex attempts in the Lutheran universities to establish metaphysics as a positive ontology around which the other sciences could be placed in orbit. Even if these philosophical institutions differed in their reception of the new natural philosophy, and the new methods associated with Bacon, Descartes and Hobbes, it is unhelpful to see them as open or closed in relation to an agreed philosophical modernity. Similarly, when modern commentators find modernity’s harbinger in one of these traditions — whether Jesuit metaphysics, Calvinist pansophism, or Lutheran ontology — this is almost always a sign of current philosophical sectarianism. The different academic philosophies represented independent institutional orderings of the truth which would be transmitted into chronological modernity in diverse ways. This is particularly apparent in the case of Jesuit Schulphilosophie, whose armed integrity allowed it to pass into the eighteenth century relatively untouched by the transformations that dissolved its Protestant rivals.

A diluted and pluralised conception of modernity is also helpful for understanding the way in which Pufendorf and Leibniz responded to the dissolution of Protestant Schulphilosophie. Assisted by the eclectic movement, and driven by a powerfully anti-
metaphysical agenda, Pufendorf sought to reorganise the entire landscape of philosophy around a Hobbesian political philosophy. Centrally concerned with the problem of how the princely territorial state could achieve stable rule over divided confessional communities, Pufendorf’s program required a philosopher who would renounce all attempts to derive political norms from a reason shared with God. Such norms were to be found instead through observation of a creature whose conduct necessitated a superior. Leibniz’s formation and context meant that he moved in a quite different direction. Operating as a savant in the world of middle-sized imperial courts, he improvised a metaphysics grounded squarely in the figure of man’s participation in divine intellection. On this basis, he sought to stem the secularising tide and maintain the sciences within the orbit of Christian philosophy. Leibniz’s program rotated around the persona of the metaphysical sage, a figure whose self-clarifying recovery of transcendent concepts and norms qualified him to govern a \textit{Vernunftstaat} modeled on a community of intellectual beings. Once again there could be no definitive resolution to the contest between these rival philosophical institutions. For, if Pufendorf’s program passed through Thomasius and down into a continuing tradition of anti-metaphysical political philosophy, then Leibniz’s metaphysics would devolve in a variety of forms through Wolff and Kant into the German metaphysical philosophy of today.